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COMMENTS
THE CASE FOR ELIMINATING DIRECT APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES
Sections 28 and 29 of title 15 of the United States Code' provide, in
substance, for direct appeal from a United States district court to the
Supreme Court in all civil antitrust cases wherein the United States is
plaintiff. The purpose of the Expediting Act, as indicated by the popular
title it carries, is to ensure speedy disposition of cases arising under the
antitrust laws. While there was practical justification for this type of
appellate procedure when the Expediting Act was passed, the present state
of antitrust law renders this special treatment obsolete. Except in rare
instances, the important issues which arise in antitrust cases today are
factual rather than legal. The great burden placed on the Supreme Court
by the Expediting Act, in terms of the necessity for review of the volumi-
nous records presented in most antitrust cases, not only takes up a dispro-
portionate amount of the valuable time of the Court, but may actually
present the danger of injustice to the litigants. This comment will con-
sider the effects that changing times have had on the Expediting Act and
will examine pending legislation which seeks to alleviate or eliminate its
undesirable aspects. Discussion of direct appeals from final and interlocu-
tory decrees in civil antitrust cases will be dealt with in separate sections.
DIRECT APPEAL FROM FINAL DECREES
Under present procedure, a direct appeal from a district court to the
Supreme Court lies in only four situations. 2 These are: (1) appeals from
suits, heard by three-judge trial courts, to enjoin enforcement of federal
or state laws on the ground of repugnance to the federal constitution;
3
(2) appeals from civil actions in which the United States is a party and
the decision declares an act of Congress unconstitutional;4 (3) appeals
from criminal actions in which a decision adverse to the government is
' Act of February 11, 1903, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 28-29 (hereinafter
referred to as the Expediting Act).
2See generally, HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(1953); ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 167-219 (1951).
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84. The three-judge trial court device was borrowed from the
Expediting Act, which was the first provision for such a trial court. Appeals from de-
cisions rendered by the three-judge court are governed by section 1253 of title 28.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1252.
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based on the invalidity or construction of a United States statute, or in
which a motion in bar has been sustained and the defendant has not been
put in jeopardy;5 and (4) appeals taken pursuant to the Expediting Act.
The Expediting Act itself contemplates two situations. Section 10 pro-
vides that the Attorney General may, at his discretion, ask for and receive
a three-judge court to hear civil antitrust actions. 7 Appeal from the three-
judge court is direct to the Supreme Court. A request for a three-judge
court, however, is rarely made." As a result, section 1 of the Act is essen-
tially inoperative. Section 2 provides that, "In every civil action brought
in any district court of the United States under any of said [antitrust]
Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final
judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court.",, Sec-
tion 2, applying as it does to all such cases, gives rise to the undesirable
aspects of the act. The remainder of this comment will largely consider
the effect of this section, and the desirability of repealing or amending it.
The Expediting Act was passed thirteen years after the Sherman Act,10
at a time when the Courts of Appeal had been in existence only twelve
years and had not yet attained their present status as the major avenue of
appeal from decisions of the district courts." Moreover, litigation under
the Sherman Act was only beginning to attain importance, 12 and each de-
cision dealt with novel rules of law, rather than new factual situations. In
this atmosphere, direct appeal provided an excellent method to quickly
5 28 U.S.C. § 3731. 6 15 U.S.C. § 28.
7 "In any civil [antitrust] action brought in any district court... wherein the United
States is plaintiff, the Attorney General may file with the clerk of such court a cer-
tificate that, in his opinion, the case is of general public importance. [Ilt shall be the
duty of the chief judge of the circuit or the presiding circuit judge, as the case may be,
to designate immediately three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one shall be
a circuit judge, to hear and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges
so designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate
in the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way
expedited." 15 U.S.C. S 28.
8 See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (1952). During
the years 1937-1952, only six cases were heard by a three-judge court under section, 1
of the act.
9 15 U.S.C. § 29. 10 15 U.S.C. § 1-2.
11 The Evarts Act, Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, interposed the circuit courts
of appeal between the Supreme Court and the circuit and district courts. Until this time,
all appeals to the Supreme Court from lower federal courts were direct, since there
were no intermediate courts. Direct review by the Supreme Court was provided by the
Evarts Act in the following situations: (a) where the jurisdiction of the lower court
was in issue; (b) from final decisions in prize cases; (c) from convictions of capital or
infamous crimes; (d) in any case involving construction of the federal constitution;
(e) in any case in which the federal constitutionality of any law of the United States,
treaty, or constitution or law of a state was at issue.
12 See, HOFSTADTER, MILLER & AARON, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 153-55 (1959).
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define the nebulous provisions of the Sherman Act. This climate has
changed radically. Direct appeal to the Supreme Court has become the ex-
ception, rather than the rule, and the Courts of Appeal provide a valuable
screening function to lighten the case load of an overtaxed Supreme
Court. Antitrust cases today present factual issues of vast complexity in-
volving voluminous records which must be fully evaluated by the review-
ing court in order that justice be done.' 3 In addition, the volume of cases
in the antitrust area has increased from about four cases per year during
the time of President Theodore Roosevelt to about ninety cases per year
in 1960.14 This change in circumstances indicates that a careful re-evalua-
tion of the Expediting Act is needed to assure that the present procedure
provides the full review sought to be guaranteed by our court system.
The Supreme Court itself has recently commented on the present
limited value of the Expediting Act. In Brown Shoe Company v. United
States, Mr. Justice Clark in his concurring opinion stated that:
The Expediting Act ... deprives the parties of an intermediate appeal and this
Court of the benefit of consideration by a Court of Appeals. Under our system
a party should be entitled to at least one appellate review; and since the sole
opportunity in cases under the Expediting Act is in this court, we usually note
jurisdiction. A fair consideration of the issues requires us to carry out the func-
tion of a Court of Appeals by examining the whole record and resolving all
questions, whether or not they are substantial. This is a great burden on the
court and seldom results in much expedition, as in this case where 2J years have
passed since the District Court's decision.15
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part to the
majority opinion in Brown, pointed out that novel questions of law are so
rarely presented in civil antitrust cases that:
[U]nder modern conditions it may well be doubted whether direct review of
such [civil antitrust] cases by this court truly serves the purpose of expedition
which underlay the original passage of the Expediting Act. I venture to predict
that a critical re-appraisal of the problem would lead to the conclusion that 'ex-
pedition' and also, over-all, more satisfactory appellate review would be
achieved in these cases were primary appellate jurisdiction returned to the
Court of Appeals .... 16
13 For instance, in United States v. Singer Manufacturing Company, 374 U.S. 174
(1963) the record contained 1,723 pages.
14 See Gesell, Much Needed Reform-Repeal the Expediting Act for Antitrust Cases,
1961 ANTITRUST L. SYM. 98, 99.
15 370 U.S. 294, 355 (1962). Mr. Justice Clark again voiced this objection in United
States v. Singer Manufacturing Company, 374 U.S. 174, 175 (1963) in a footnote to his
majority opinion. Mr. Justice White, in his concurring opinion at page 197, indicated
that he could not agree with this position. The Court is not, therefore, in complete
unanimity on the issue.
16 370 U.S. 294, 364-65 (1962).
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These statements by two Justices with a combined experience of twen-
ty-two years on the Supreme Court bench should not go unheeded by the
profession or Congress. While the great burden placed on the Court might
not, in itself, be sufficient to warrant repeal of the Act, the danger of in-
justice and the lack of actual expedition should swing the balance toward
amendment or repeal.
APPEALS FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECREES-AN AREA OF CONFUSION
The Expediting Act does not in terms deal with interlocutory appeals,
but speaks only of appeals from final judgments. However, in United
States v. California Cooperative Canneries,17 the Supreme Court held that
interlocutory decrees entered in civil antitrust cases were not subject to
review at all, either by the Courts of Appeal or by the Supreme Court. In
that opinion, rendered by Mr. Justice Brandeis, the Court said that by the
Expediting Act "Congress limited the right of review to an appeal from
the decree which disposed of all matters, and it precluded the possibility
of an appeal to either court [the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court]
from an interlocutory decree."18 While this decision was consistent with
the state of the law on interlocultory decrees at the time of the enactment
of the Expediting Act, subsequent laws on the subject have clouded the
issue.19
The Judicial Code of 1948 contained a section allowing appeals to the
Courts of Appeal from interlocutory decrees "except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court. '20 Since it is clear that no direct
appeal may be had to the Supreme Court on an interlocutory decree
entered in a civil antitrust case, a possible conclusion is that Congress
meant to declare that such interlocutory decrees should be reviewed by
the Courts of Appeal. A recent case dealt with the issue in precisely this
manner. In United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Company 21 the government
17 279 U.S. 553 (1929) (hereinafter referred to as Canneries).
18 Id. at 558.
19 The Evarts Act, 26 Stat. 826, was in force in 1903 when the Expediting Act was
passed. Section 7 of the Evarts Act provided for appeal of interlocutory decrees to the
circuit courts of appeal only when final decrees were reviewable there. Since appeals
from final judgments in civil antitrust cases lay only to the Supreme Court, appeal of
interlocutory decrees to the circuit courts of appeal was precluded. Subsequent legis-
lation, however, amended this aspect of the Evarts Act, and it has been argued that
at the time Canneries was decided, a proper consideration of the existing law would
have led to the conclusion that interlocutory decrees should have been held to be
appealable at that time. See United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Company, 320 F.2d 509 (3rd
Cir. 1963) for a full discussion of the relevant legislative history.
20 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) (1).
21320 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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filed suit against Ingersoll and others under section 7 of the Clayton Act,22
and the District Court granted an interlocutory injunction against a pro-
posed merger. 23 Ingersoll appealed under subsection 1292 (a) (1) of title
18 of the United States Code 2 4 the successor to the interlocutory appeals
provision in the 1948 Judicial Code. The court held, by the above reason-
ing, and by reading sections 1291 and 1292 together, that Congress must
have intended to permit appeals from both final and interlocutory decrees
to the Courts of Appeal, unless such decrees can be appealed directly to
the Supreme Court. Further, since interlocutory decrees are not appeal-
able to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act, such decrees must
be appealable to the Courts of Appeal. While this perhaps attributes more
erudition to Congress than is deserved, the conclusion is plausible from the
standpoint of logic. The Third Circuit evidently stands alone in holding
that such interlocutory decrees are appealable.
The case of United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers25 illustrates the opposite position. In this case, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York was asked for a ruling
under a previous consent decree entered in a civil antitrust action, and the
application was dismissed. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court
under the Expediting Act, but the Supreme Court refused to note prob-
able jurisdiction, without stating a reason.26 Appeal was then taken to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This tribunal denied the appeal
holding that, if the decree of the District Court were final, then the appeal
had to be to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act. If, on the other
hand, the decree were interlocutory, then no appeal whatsoever would be
available by reason of the Canneries doctrine. It seems that the line of
argument presented in the Ingersoll case was not before the court.27
Although the full Supreme Court has not been directly faced with this
problem, the Court evidently intends to follow the Canneries case. In a
footnote to the Brown Shoe case, Mr. Justice Warren indicated that by
22 15 U.S.C. § 18.
23 United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Company, 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
24 Section 1291 of title 18 of the United States Code provides, in substance, that the
Courts of Appeal shall have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of the district
courts except where a direct appeal may be had to the Supreme Court. Subsection 1292
(a) (1) is an identical provision applying to interlocutory decrees.
25 317 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1963). 26371 U.S. 540 (1963).
27The decision of the Second Circuit was recently reversed by the Supreme Court
sub. nom. Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, 375 U.S. 39 (1963). Here it was held that all of the previous
argument was for naught, since in truth the United States was not a party; and, there-
fore, the Expediting Act did not apply. This reveals the reason for the Court's refusal
to hear an appeal directly from the District Court.
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the Expediting Act "Congress ... precluded the possibility of an appeal
either to this Court or the Court of Appeals from an interlocultory de-
cree."'28 In United States v. FMC Corporation, the trial court denied a
government motion for an interlocutory injunction against a proposed
merger, 29 and an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was
denied.30 The government applied to Mr. Justice Goldberg for an order
enjoining the merger pending the Supreme Court's consideration of an
application for certiorari. 31 In denying the application for an injunction,
the Justice stated that the reasoning of the Ingersoll case was "plausible
but not persuading,"3 2 and that "if antitrust procedures are to be changed,
the changes should derive not from a plausible construction of codified
provisions but from deliberate, explicit congressional action. 33
There is one very limited method for appealing interlocutory decrees in
civil antitrust cases. This involves petitioning for a common law writ of
certiorari under the so-called "all-writs" section of the Judicial Code.' 4
However, the Supreme Court has stated that where "the statutory scheme
permits appellate review of interlocutory orders only on appeal from the
final judgment, review by certiorari or other extraordinary writ is not
permissible. .... -35 This type of writ is rarely issued and cannot be said to
solve the type of problems which have been discussed above.
The most practical resolution of this dilemma is to repeal or amend the
Expediting Act. If this were done, both final and interlocutory judgments
of the district courts would be appealable to the Courts of Appeal, since
sections 1291 and 1292 (a) (1) would come into effect in this type of
case. The most common objection to this solution is that many opportuni-
ties for delay would become available to the unscrupulous defendant.36
28 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 294, 305. This statement is a mere
dictuo, however, since the Court found the lower court decree to be final and appeal-
able under section 1291 of title 18 of the United States Code.
29 United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
30 United States v. FMC Corp., 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963).
31 United States v. FMC Corp., - U.S. -, 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963).
32 1d. at 6.
331d. at 7.
34 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a). This section allows the Supreme Court to issue "all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their ... jurisdiction...."
35 United States Alkali Export Association, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 202
(1945). In this case the writ was allowed to issue since the issue was the jurisdiction of
the district court. Thus, where the district court enters an order without jurisdiction,
even though the order is interlocutory in nature, the Supreme Court may take juris-
diction. See also DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
36 See, e.g., Soloman, Repeal of the Expediting Act-A Negative View, 1961 ANTI-
TusT L. SYM. 94, 96.
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This same argument, however, can be made against allowing such appeals
in any type of case. Since it has been concluded that the interests of justice
are best served by allowing appeals from interlocutory decrees in the vast
majority of cases, little reason appears for not providing a similar pro-
cedure in civil antitrust cases.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
At this writing, two bills have been introduced in Congress to change
and clarify the procedure dealing with direct appeals from final judg-
ments and appeals from interlocutory decrees in civil antitrust cases.
These are Senate Bill No. 1811, drafted by the American Bar Association's
antitrust section and introduced by Senator Olin Johnston,37 and Senate
Bill No. 1892, drafted by the Department of Justice and introduced by
Senator James Eastland. 38 These bills differ in two important respects:
First, the Johnston Bill provides that section 1 of the Expediting Act,39
allowing the Attorney General to call for a three-judge District Court in
cases of general public importance, shall not apply to antitrust cases; 40 the
Eastland Bill, however, would leave this section unchanged. Second, the
Johnston Bill would completely eliminate direct appeals from antitrust
cases heard by a single district court judge, while the Eastland Bill would
allow either the Attorney General or the district court to certify that the
case is of general public importance, in which case appeal from a final
judgment would be only to the Supreme Court.
As a practical matter, it would seem to make little difference whether
or not the first section of the Expediting Act relating to three-judge
courts is applied to antitrust cases. As Senator Johnston indicated when
introducing his bill to the Senate,
Section 1 [of the Expediting Act] has long since fallen into disuse. With
dockets crowded as they are today, the Federal judiciary has made clear its
antagonism to three-judge trial courts, and it has been many years since the
Attorney General has invoked such a court.41
Senator Johnston's bill proceeds on the theory that antitrust litigation
should be put on the same footing as other similar actions brought by the
Government. It is difficult to see why appeals in criminal antitrust actions
42
37 Senator Johnston is Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in
Judiciary Machinery. Senate Bill No. 1811 is hereinafter referred to as the Johnston Bill.
38 Senator Eastland is Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Senate
Bill No. 1892 is hereinafter referred to as the Eastland Bill.
39 15 U.S.C. S 28.
40 This Bill, however, would retain this procedure as it applies to actions brought
under the Interstate Commerce Commission Act.
41 109 CoNG. REc. 11261 (1963) (remarks of Senator Johnson).
42 FE.. R. CRIM. P. 37.
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and from the Federal Trade Commission 43 should go to the Courts of
Appeal while an option exists to appeal to the Supreme Court from civil
antitrust actions. It appears to the writer that the provision allowing a
three-judge trial court in civil antitrust actions has no more present valid-
ity than the other provisions of the Expediting Act, and should be elimi-
nated.
The relevant portions of the Johnston Bill dealing with appeals from
single-judge courts read as follows:
SEC. 2 This Act shall not be construed as limiting or narrowing in any
respect the right of any party to any civil action brought in any district court
of the United States under [the Sherman Act] or any other Acts having a like
purpose that have been or hereafter may be enacted, wherein the United States
is plaintiff, from seeking direct review by the Supreme Court of a final judg-
ment of a district court of the United States by appealing to a court of appeals
and petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, under section 1254
(1) of title 28, United States Code, before rendition of judgment.
SEC. 3 The provisions of section 1292 (a) (1) and (b) of title 28, United
States Code shall be applicable in any civil action brought in any district court
of the United States under [the Sherman Act] or any other Acts having a like
purpose that have been or hereafter may be enacted, wherein the United States
is plaintiff.44
Strictly speaking, these two sections merely make explicit what should
be the natural effect of repealing section 2 of the Expediting Act. Once
direct appeal is eliminated, civil antitrust cases would automatically come
within the purview of section 1291, which allows appeal from a final judg-
ment to the Court of Appeals when the case is not appealable directly to
the Supreme Court. Once appeal to the Court of Appeals is established,
the certiorari procedure should come into play. The purpose of section 2
is to make it clear that the intent was not to eliminate the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction over antitrust matters, a possible conclusion if the section
were not included. Similarly, section 3 of this Bill makes explicit that sub-
sections 1292 (a) (1) and 1292 (b), which permit appeals from interlocu-
tory decrees, shall apply to civil antitrust cases. This expression of Con-
gressional intent appears to be of value in view of the confusion as to the
present status of the appealability of such decrees.
For comparison, the relevant sections of the Eastland Bill read as fol-
lows:
In every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under
any of said [antitrust] Acts, wherein the United States is complainant and
43 15 U.S.C. § 45 (c).
44 Section I of the Johnston Bill is the present 15 U.S.C. § 28, but it eliminates its
application to antitrust cases as discussed supra. Section 4 provides that S. 1811 shall not
apply to cases wherein a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to
its enactment.
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wherein the Attorney General, or the district court either on application of a
party or upon its own motion, has certified that the case is of general public
importance, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only
to the Supreme Court.
No such certification may be made by the Attorney General or the district
court on its own motion, nor shall an application for a certificate be made to
the district court by any party, more than thirty days after final judgment. In
any case in which a party applies to the district court for a certificate, unless
such application is granted within forty days after final judgment, it shall be
deemed denied.
If the certificate of the Attorney General is filed after the entry of a final
judgment of the district court, section 1 of this Act shall not apply.45
In any action in which a certificate has not been filed, appeal may be taken
to the court of appeals from any final judgment entered therein, as provided
in section 1291 of title 28 of the United States Code, and from interlocutory
orders, as provided in section 1292 (a) (1) of title 28 of the United States Code
but not otherwise; and any judgment entered by the court of appeals in such
case shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon
a writ of certiorari as provided in section 1254 (1) of title 28 of the United
States Code.46
Under this bill the status of the route of appeal would apparently be as
follows: First, if the Attorney General files a certificate of general public
importance before trial, a three-judge court will be required and appeals
will lie only to the Supreme Court; interlocutory decrees will not then be
appealable. Second, if the Attorney General files such a certificate after
final judgment, or the district court, upon its own motion or upon appli-
cation of a party certifies that the case is of general public importance,
then appeal will again lie only to the Supreme Court. Third, where no
such certificate has yet been filed in the cause, final and interlocutory
decrees will be appealable to the Courts of Appeal. The Supreme Court
may review on a writ of certiorari. It thus appears quite possible that in a
given case, interlocutory appeals would lie to the Court of Appeals, while
appeal from a final judgment would lie only to the Supreme Court if a
certificate were filed.
There is no question that the enactment of either of these bills would
improve upon the present procedure. Direct appeals to the Supreme Court
would be eliminated in at least the majority of cases, and in both bills the
appealability of interlocutory decrees would be established. The only
noteworthy difference between the bills is found in the certification
procedure provided by the Eastland Bill. The Department of Justice
45 The purpose of the provision is to make clear that a three-judge court need not be
convened when a case in which a certificate of the Attorney General was filed after
final judgment is remanded after appeal. Letter from Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy to (then) Vice-President Johnson, April 25, 1963.
46 Section 2 of S. 1892 provides that the act shall not apply to cases wherein a notice
of appeal to the Supreme Court has been filed prior to its enactment.
